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WHY NOT GOD THE MOTHER?
Andrew J. Dell'Olio

This essay considers recent criticism of the use of inclusive language within
Christian discourse, particularly the reference to God as "Mother." The author
argues that these criticisms fail to establish that the supplemental usage of
"God the Mother," in addition to the traditional usage of "God the Father," is
inappropriate for Christian God-talk. Some positive reasons for referring to
God as "Mother" are also offered, not the least of which is its helpfulness in
overcoming overly restrictive conceptions of God.

In light of the increasing acceptance among Christians of more inclusive,
less androcentric language about God, concerns have been raised about
the propriety of speaking about God in female terms. The critics of the
growing inclusive language movement are particularly troubled by the
practice of referring to God as "Mother" in addition to - or in some
cases, instead of - the traditional appellation, "God the Father." For
some of these critics, the usage of such language risks the very identity
and integrity of the Christian faith. For example, in a recent collection of
essays critical of the inclusive language movement, Leslie Zeigler decries
those Christian feminists who have ignored the fact that "a number of
scholars have published clear and convincing arguments that the use of
female language for God results in a denial of the gospel."l
Upon examining these arguments, however, I believe they will be
found to be markedly less than clear and convincing. In what follows I
will focus on the work of Elizabeth Achtemeier and others who argue
that Christians ought not call God "Mother."2 I will suggest that these
arguments are not persuasive. I will not, however, endeavor to defend
those feminist theologians who aim to eliminate all masculine language
about God including the reference to God as "Father". There are many
good reasons for retaining such language in Christian practice, not the
least of which is the fact that masculine language about God is used in
the Bible and that Jesus does explicitly refer to God as "Father." Instead
I will suggest that the supplementary use of feminine language for God,
including the term "Mother-God," not only withstands the criticisms
leveled against it but also commends itself for positive reasons, in particular, its helpfulness in overcoming overly restrictive conceptions of
God. 3
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Faith and Philosophy
I. The Appeal to Biblical Explicitness

One purported reason for the view that Christians should not call
God "Mother" is that the Bible does not do so. According to Elizabeth
Achtemeier, "the Bible uses masculine language for God because that is
the language with which God has revealed himself."4 Since Christianity
is a revealed religion, it "claims no knowledge of God beyond the
knowledge God has given of himself through his words and deeds in
the histories of Israel and of Jesus Christ and his church."s Thus, for
Achtemeier, since the Biblical revelation contains predominantly masculine language about God and since "God is the one whom Jesus reveals
as his Father,"6 we must conclude that God cannot properly be referred
to as "Mother."7
Implicit in this view is what we might call the appeal to Biblical
explicitness. This is the claim that only those terms that are explicitly
used in the Bible may count as legitimate metaphors for God. Since
"Mother" is not used explicitly in the Bible to refer to God, the use of the
term "Mother" for God should be excluded from Christian discourse.
It seems to me that there are a number of problems with this line of
thinking. First, it is not true that Christianity is a religion which claims
that nothing can be known about God outside of the Biblical revelation.
There is a long tradition in Christianity of believing that God can be
known, at least in some sense, through the world God has created. This
view, held in common by such eminent Christian theologians as Thomas
Aquinas and John Calvin, has biblical precedents. Consider Psalm 19
which informs us that "The Heavens declare the glory of God," or Paul's
own declaration that "The invisible things of God are understood by the
things God has made" (Romans 1.20). Thus, Aquinas, for example, in
his well-known doctrine of analogy, taught that we can know something
about God by analogy to the things God has made, in the way we can
know something about an unseen cause from its perceived effects. 8 All
sorts of terms that might not be explicitly mentioned in the Bible but are
nonetheless consistent with, if not implied by what is said, may then be
usefully employed within Christian discourse about God. We need just
think of such fruitful descriptions for God within Christian theology as
"most perfect being" or "uncaused first cause," or, for that matter, the
term "person." While these terms are not themselves part of the Biblical
revelation, they nonetheless further our understanding of what is explicitly stated therein.
The claim that language about God ought to be restricted to what is
explicitly stated in the Bible, therefore, is out of step with both the
Christian theological tradition and the Bible itself. It is not a good reason for excluding "Mother" from Christian discourse about God, especially if there is good reason, as there is, to think that such positive qualities of earthly mothers as unconditional love and selfless nurturance
may fruitfully serve as analogies to the loving and nurturing qualities of
the God revealed in Jesus Christ. 9 For such an analogy is perfectly consistent with what Christians know of God as revealed in scripture.
Indeed, the Biblical revelation itself suggests as much. For, contrary
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to the claims of some critics of the use of feminine language about God
- William Harper, for example - God does not reveal Godself in the
Bible in exclusively masculine language. 1O There are numerous Biblical
examples of the use of feminine language to describe God, from the midwife imagery of Psalms 22.9 and the childbirthing imagery of Isaiah
42.14, to the image of the woman searching for her lost coins in Luke
15.3-10. The claim that "God revealed Himself exclusively in male
terms"ll is simply false. The feminine language that does explicitly
occur in the Bible may then serve as a basis for the use of certain feminine terms (like "mother") in connection with God since such terms are
consistent with the feminine language that is explicitly used.

II. Metaphors and Similes
In contrast to Harper, Achtemeier does acknowledge that there are
some feminine images of God in the Bible, although she claims that such
language does not carry the same weight as the masculine images. This
is because, following Roland Frye,l2 she notes that the figures of speech
employed in these cases are similes rather than metaphors and that this
makes all the difference. While both simile and metaphor are used to
compare one thing to another, a simile's comparison is self-limiting. As
Achtemeier puts it, "A simile compares one aspect of something to
another. .. .In metaphors, on the other hand, identity between the subject
and the thing compared to it is assumed."13 In other words, while a simile says one thing is like another in certain respects, that is, in virtue of a
likeness in some aspect or quality, a metaphor says one thing in its
entirety simply is another thing. A metaphor thereby expresses a fuller,
more complete comparison. Thus, in the Biblical statement "1 will cry
out like a woman in labor" (Isaiah 42.14), Achtemeier and Frye claim
that God is here compared to a woman only in certain aspects, but not
wholly, that is, God is not identified with a woman. Feminine language
about God in the Bible never compares the whole of God with a woman
or a mother as is the case with the Biblical metaphors of God as Father,
King, Judge, etc. For Achtemeier and Frye, this would be a good reason
to desist from using the predicating metaphor "God the Mother."
This claim requires some careful examination. In the first place, it is
not at all clear that the distinction between metaphor and simile can bear
the weight Achtemeier and Frye place upon it. Both are still equally figurative uses of language and the identities made in predicating
metaphors are still only comparisons, not strict equivalencies. Take the
following fairly standard definition of metaphor: "A metaphor is commonly defined as an implied comparison between two things unlike in
most respects but alike in the respect in which they are compared."14
Note how metaphor is here defined in terms that are almost identical to
the way in which Achtemeier and Frye define simile, that is, as a comparison between two different things in certain respects, not as an identity equivalence. In this regard, Sallie McFague's point that metaphors
always express what something "is not" as much as they express what
something "is" serves as a useful corrective to those who would too pos-
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itively identify a metaphor with that to which it figuratively stands in
comparison.'s For all analogical predication of the divine involves a
comparison of finite to infinite, a comparison that always leaves unsaid
much more than is said. A metaphor for God is then as much unlike
God as it is like God, indeed, it is more unlike than like God, for the
finite can never truly compare to the infinite.
Secondly, it is worth noting that not all linguistic theorists draw such
sharp differences between metaphors and similes. Terence Hawkes
explains that metaphors and similes are both figures of speech that
"transfer" or "carryover" (metll-phom) meaning from one thing to another, with the difference that simile performs this meaning transference by
the use of such terms as "like" or "as if."'6 For this reason the comparison made by a simile is more focused and pre-determined. Yet Hawkes
goes on to say that, rather than think of simile as metaphor's poor relation, "the 'controlled' effects of simile can be as great or greater than the
wider but often vaguer implications of metaphor."'7 He adds, "In any
case, abstract value-judgements are pointless."'s And Janet Martin
Soskice has also argued against the superiority of metaphor over simile,
maintaining that, while they may differ in grammatical form, they are
nonetheless functionally equivalent. '9 If Hawkes and Soskice are correct,
then there is no basis for the claim of Achtemeier and Frye that
metaphor is superior to simile by virtue of the strength of its comparisons. Therefore, contrary to Achtemeier and Frye, metaphors ought not
to be regarded as a linguistically privileged form of figurative language.
Some linguistic theorists have even urged the abandonment of the
distinction between metaphor and simile. Owen Barfield, for example,
regards a metaphor as simply "a simile with the word 'like' missed
out."20 Philip Wheelwright also suggests that "the grammarian's familiar
distinction between metaphor and simile is to be largely ignored." 2l
And, in a more philosophical vein, Robert Fogelin has argued persuasively in defense of the traditional Aristotelian position that metaphors
are simply elliptical similes. 22 Given the lack of consensus by philosophers and linguistic theorists as to the difference between metaphor and
simile, much less the superiority of the former to the latter, it would seen
that the distinction between metaphor and simile is a weak basis upon
which to build the position that Christians ought not speak of God as
"Mother."
Yet, even if we grant that the distinction between simile and
metaphor is significant, one need not grant the inference Achtemeier
and Frye draw from it. That is, even if similes only compare aspects of
things rather than wholes, this does not bar the corresponding use of a
full-blown predicative metaphor that builds on the aspects compared in
the simile. For, after all, it is a commonplace within philosophy to
regard aspects or qualities as inhering in some thing or substance rather
than as "free-floating" entities. All but the most die-hard Platonists
would agree that "wetness" does not appear apart from wet things.
And even if there is some debate about the ontological status of universal predicables, our language clearly functions in such a way that qualities are predicated of some subject. A predicate does not stand alone but
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is always predicated of a thing. So where there are predicates (aspects,
qualities, properties, etc.), it is implied that there are things which bear
these predicates.
It is also a philosophical commonplace to regard some of these predicates (qualities or properties) as determining the nature of that thing in
an essential way. For example, Aristotle defined the human being as the
"rational animal" because he took rational thought to be an essential
property of human beings. Rationality is predicated of human beings in
such a unique way that, in addition to animality, it is picked out as the
defining quality of human nature. Human beings may then be thought
of as those animals in whom one may typically, if not exclusively, find
such properties as cogitation, reflection, deliberation, etc. It follows,
therefore, that if one comes across the use of the predicates "cogitates,"
"reflects," "deliberates," etc. in discourse about an animal, then one is
reasonable in assuming that animal is a human being.23 As the old saying goes, "if it walks like a duck and talks like a duck, it's a duck." So,
for example, if in some discourse one finds duck-predicates used to
describe a thing, one would be perfectly within one's linguistic rights to
refer to that thing in subsequent discourse as a duck.
Now if one finds maternal predicates ascribed to a subject, as is the
case in certain Biblical descriptions of God, it would seem that one is
within one's linguistic rights to refer to God as "Mother." After all,
mothers are those beings who paradigmatically possess maternal properties described by maternal predicates. Of course, not all things that
possess maternal properties need be mothers. Certainly something
besides a mother - a father, perhaps - can possess maternal and other
feminine traits. Yet there are some maternal traits or properties that no
being but a mother could possess. These would be those essential properties that uniquely pick out mothers from all other beings, for example,
the ability to give birth and suckle the young. So if God is described in
the Bible in terms of birthing imagery - for example, in Moses' warning
to the Israelites that "You forget the God who gave you birth"
(Deuteronomy 32:18) - then one could, with good reason, speak of God
as "Mother" in addition to "Father". Some qualities the Bible reveals
about God are just not captured by the Father metaphor alone. Fathers,
after all, do not give birth.24
The feminine, and especially maternal, similes which occur in the
Bible give the Christian not only reasonable warrant to go beyond the
exclusive use of the Father metaphor when speaking about God, but an
imperative to do so. At the very least, to speak of God as "Mother" does
not appear to be a use of language that is contrary to the way God is
revealed in the Bible. One would need some other reason to believe that
such language is somehow illegitimate.

III. Appeal to Words of Jesus
Some might respond that Christians have a definitive authority in the
matter of how to speak about God, namely, God incarnate, Jesus Christ.
Since Jesus explicitly refers to God as Father and never as Mother,
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Christians could do no better than to follow in his example. Indeed,
Christians are obligated to do so. As Achtemeier puts it, "God is not just
any god, capable of being named according to human fancy. No, God is
the one whom Jesus reveals as his Father."2s But all that this version of
the appeal to explicitness establishes is that there are good reasons, in
the positive example of the explicit words of Jesus, for Christians to call
God "Father." It does not establish that there are good reasons not to
call God "Mother."26 That is, even if Jesus's explicit use of a term may
serve as justification for its use by Christians, it does not follow that the
absence of the explicit use of a term renders the use of that term by
Christians illicit.
Besides, I know of no theological principle, Biblical or otherwise, that
demands that only those words explicitly used by Jesus in referring to
God may be used by Christians for the same purpose. If that were the
case, not only would a host of theological terms be shorn from the
Christian lexicon, but so would every Biblical term used to describe God
not explicitly mentioned by Jesus. Rather than protect Christian discourse from erosion, such a misguided principle risks its decimation.
Furthermore, there is a basis in Jesus's own words for making room
in Christian discourse for God the Mother. Recall the Gospel of Luke
where Jesus refers to himself as a mother hen desiring to gather her
chicks under her wings (Luke 13.34).27 If, as Christians believe, Jesus is
God incarnate, and if Jesus refers to himself as possessing maternal
desires, then Christians have good reason to speak of God as having
maternal desires for her children. And since Jesus's own words legitimize language about God's maternal qualities, and since maternal qualities typically inhere in mothers, Christians have good reason to speak
about God as Mother.2" It is a use of language that is perfectly consistent
with the Biblical revelation, including the words of Jesus.
Perhaps the most sophisticated version of the appeal to the words of
Jesus has recently been articulated by Donald D. Hook and Alvin F.
Kimel, Jr. In their "theolinguistic" analysis of this issue, they argue that
Jesus uses the term "Father" as "a vocative and designating term" or
"designating title" for God which "functions like a proper name in its
unique referentiality."29 As a consequence, the divine title "Father,"
"possesses privileged and foundational status within Christian discourse,"30 and is not easily replaced by the term "Mother."
First, the view that "Father" is a rigid designator, functioning like a
proper name, is a peculiar one for Hook and Kimmel to hold. For if the
term "Father" really functions like a proper name, then it is devoid of all
metaphorical significance. The term "Father" would be merely a tag
attached to God and then handed down through the ages, much like the
name "Cicero" or "Tully" - proper names which have no metaphorical
significance whatsoever. But surely the term "Father" has some
metaphorical significance with regard to God. Therefore, the term cannot simply be treated as a proper name. 31
But let us assume that Hook and Kimel are correct that the term
"Father" is to be regarded as a designative title which has functioned in
Christian discourse as a proper name with privileged status. Still, it
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does not follow from this that the term "Mother" can not come to be
regarded in this way. That is, while Hook and Kimel's analysis may
provide a good reason why the term "Father" ought not to be abandoned
by Christians, it does not provide a good reason why the term "Mother"
ought to be eschewed.
Yet, we find this sort of problematic reasoning in Hook and Kimel's
three explicit objections to substituting "Mother" for "Father" or alternating "Mother" with "Father," particularly in the first objection. 32 This
objection involves a direct appeal to the explicit words of Jesus who, in
addressing God as "Father," initiates a causal network, or borrowing the
terminology of Michael Devitt, a "designating chain" of reference. 33 The
term "Father" is thus said to be "a uniquely referring title related to
divinity by the designating chain of dominical and apostolic practice."34
Hook and Kimel go on to assert that, "If we wish to invoke God or refer
to him successfully, we rightly return to the ecclesial d-chain. It is the
historical community of the Church that equips us to name God truly."35
Once again, assuming that Hook and Kimel are correct about the powers of the historical community of the Church to name God truly, all we
have is a reason for referring to God as "Father." We do not have a reason for eschewing the term "Mother" as supplement for "Father." Hook
and Kimel, however, believe that the absence of a designating chain for
the term "Mother" originating in the explicit words of Jesus does constitute a reason for not using that term in Christian discourse in the way we
use the term "Father." But this commits them to the view that Christians
are only justified in addressing or referring to God when they use names
of God which have been rigidly designated of God by Jesus. And this
seems to be nothing more than a variant of the appeal to the explicit
words of Jesus which we have already found to be groundless.
Hook and Kimel's suggestion that "Father" functions like a proper
name or rigid designator does not help their case. While it is true that
Christians rightly refer to God through the use of the name "Father", a
name originating in an "initial baptism" or designating speech act of
Jesus, this is not a reason to deny that "Mother" can also serve as a name
which rigidly designates God. A rigid designator is not an exclusive
designator. "Tully" is as much a rigid designator for Cicero as is
"Cicero" since both names refer to the same person, that is, both names
equally "fix the referent."36 Hook and Kimel admit as much when they
note that it is always possible to give a new name or nickname to an
individual/7 presumably by a similar act of rigid designation.
Hook and Kimel, however, claim that the use of such a new name for
God would be unjustified unless its "initial baptism" occurred in a new
revelation "that would ground the new naming and from which would
flow subsequent designation."38 But Hook and Kimel give no additional
justification why this new naming must have as its ground a new revelation. This seems to be another variant of the appeal to Biblical explicitness, an appeal we have already determined to have reason to reject.
For if Christians can rightly refer to God by general terms that do not
explicitly appear in biblical revelation, there is no reason to require that
the rigid designation of proper names of God can occur only in a revela-
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tion. There need only be some reference-fixing path from the names to
God, regardless of how that reference originally got fixed. For example,
the original reference-fixing act, the "initial baptism" of the name, may
have occurred by ostension in a direct religious experience of God.
Presumably this was the case for Julian of Norwich whose mystical
experience of Cod was the basis for her naming God "Mother."J'!
The occurrence of an "initial baptism" of God as "Mother," whether
by Julian of Norwich or the prior Christian community,"'l and the existence of an ecclesial designating chain of reference or path from present
speakers, via Mary Baker Eddy to medieval Cistercians and Beguines to
this naming of God, are all that Christians need to use "Mother" as a
proper name or rigid designator of Cod. The fact that God is not explicitly named or designated "Mother" in the Biblical revelation, therefore,
does not rule out the legitimate naming or designating of Cod as
"Mother" by subsequent speakers in the Christian tradition.
Hook and Kimel's second and third objections to the use of the term
"Mother" for God are both based on the grammatical gender of the
terms. In the second objection, Hook and Kimel make the following
claim:
... "Mother" and "Father" are mutually exclusive terms. They are
overtly marked for feminine and masculine gender, respectively,
and therefore should not be used in modern English to name the
same object. To do so is to disrupt gender concord and confuse the
hearer. 11
And in the third objection, they make a similar claim, this time based on
the gender of God in the grammar of the Biblical narrative:
... the feminine gender of "Mother" disagrees both with the grammatical gender of the biblical deity and with the gender of the
English word 'God.' ... Within the narrative presentation of the Holy
Scriptures, divinity is assigned masculine grammatical gender (as
opposed to sex), which governs the choice of names, titles, and
pronouns for God .... This narrative telling is constitutive for the
worship and discourse of the Church and our theological identification of Cod:2
It seems to me that in both of these objections Hook and Kimel place
inordinate importance on the limitations of grammar to decide what
mayor may not be said of the unlimited divine being Christians worship. If both "Father" and "Mother" are metaphors and, as Hook and
Kimel admit, do not in a literal sense signify the sexuality of the God
they describe, it is unclear why they still insist that "if 'Father' properly
designates the deity, then 'Mother' cannot logically do so - and vice
versa."43 Certainly Christians know that God has no real gender, so why
think that the use of a name which bears one grammatical gender logically rules out the use of a name which bears another? In languages
whose nominatives are gendered, regardless of the actual gender of the
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referent, it is not unusual to find two synonyms of different grammatical
gender. For example, the ordinary German word for "corpse" is
"Leiche," which is grammatically feminine, while its more dignified synonym, "Leichnam," is grammatically masculine. The very same body,
regardless of its real gender, may be referred to by either a grammatically feminine or a grammatically masculine term. One would think that in
the case of God, a being Christians know to have no actual gender, the
use of two nominatives of differing grammatical gender would be even
less problematic.
And why should Hook and Kimel think that the exclusive use of one
grammatical gender prevents the "confusion" inclusive language would
supposedly otherwise cause? One should rather think that the deliberately exclusive use of one grammatical gender for a being who is literally gender less is more likely to cause confusion in the hearers of this sort
of discourse. For Christians who are constantly exposed to this kind of
discourse are much more likely to confuse grammatical gender with real
gender, mistakenly imagining or conceptualizing God as "male" rather
than sexually transcendent. The exclusive use of the term "Father" and
other exclusively masculine titles for God hinders rather than aids clear
thinking about God.
Hook and Kimel seem to have caused even themselves some confusion on this matter. After having acknowledged that God is "sexually
transcendent" with no real gender, they nevertheless go on to write:
The notional gender of modern English requires that the gender of
vocative titles agree with the gender of their referent. We may
speak figuratively of God as an eagle nurturing her young or as a
mother-bear protecting her cubs; but we will name him 'Father',
not'Mother'.44
The point here is that the grammatical gender of the vocative title
"Father" determines that the referent of that title, God, share its gender.
In other words, Hook and Kimel seem to be suggesting that the limitations of our grammar also limit and fix the real gender of God. What
else could it mean for God, as referent of the title "Father", to share
agreement with the gender of this title, than for God to be literally masculine? Hook and Kimel seem to have invested grammatical gender
with the magical power to determine that a gender less God possesses
exclusively masculine gender. For the only reason that Hook and Kimel
have for denying that we can name God "Mother" appears to be that,
because of the rigid designation of the name "Father," God's real gender
is masculine.
The problem here is that Hook and Kimel seem to be using a rigid designator to infer something of the real nature of the referent of that designator. That is, they are allowing a rigid designator to function as a kind of
description of its referent, so that to designate God as "Father" is tantamount to describing God as "our masculine parent." In doing so, Hook
and Kimel subvert the very point of Kripke's theory of rigid designation that names are not descriptions. And in this they are seriously confused.
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It would have been better had Hook and Kimel suggested that
because God has no real gender, we ought not limit our naming of God
to one grammatically masculine name. This is consistent with the
Christian tradition in its early formative and medieval periods which
produced a number of discourses on the divine names, the most famous
and most influential being that of Pseudo-Dionysius. The main theme of
these discourses is the realization that because God's transcendent being
is limitless, we, as limited beings, are unable to know the divine essence
as it is. "From this we see the necessity of giving to God many names,"
writes Thomas Aquinas in the Summa Contra Gentiles, for we name God
by analogy to what we can know, that is, from "the perfections belonging to things" which are found to be diverse. Therefore, the names by
which we signify God's limited perfection must also be diverse. As
Aquinas goes on to explain:

Were we able to understand the divine essence itself as it is and
give to it the name that belongs to it, we would express it by only
one name. This is promised to those who will see God through
God's essence: "In that day there shall be one Lord, and his name
shall be one" (Zach. 14.9).45
Until the time that has been promised us comes to pass, it is best that
we call God by many names lest we presume that we have already
arrived at the knowledge of God as God truly is. For the purposes of
our discussion, then, it is best that we not exclude the use of the name
"Mother" in addition to "Father" in Christian discourse lest we mistakenly delimit the unlimited essence of God and forget the ineffable divine
name that is "above all other names" (Philippians 2.9).

W. The Risk of Pantheism
The most straightforwardly theological reason for avoiding calling
God "Mother" is that doing so risks a slippery slope into the age-old
heresy of pantheism, that is, it leads to the identification of God with the
world. For, the critics maintain, to conceive of God as Mother, is to conceive of the world being "born" of the very body of God. In this way it
identifies God and the world and fails to distinguish the creator from the
creation. According to Achetemeier, the Bible's language for God is
masculine in order to set God apart from nature and thereby distinguish
the Biblical God from the pre-Biblical deities who are not differentiated
from the world. For Achtemeier, "It is precisely the introduction of
female language for God that opens the door to such identification of
God with the world .... "46 She claims, furthermore, "If God is identified
with his creation, we finally make ourselves gods and goddesses - the
ultimate and primeval sin, according to Genesis 3 and the rest of the
Scriptures." 47
To speak of God as "Father," however, reinforces the distinction
between creator and creation for this language suggests God's transcendence and otherness from the world. "God, the biblical writers are say-
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ing, is in no way contained in or bound up with or dependent on or
revealed through his creation."'" That is why the Bible does not speak of
the world as a part of the being of God but "as an object of the divine
speech."49 "God creates the world outside of himself, by the instrument
of his Word."'" So, God does not "give birth" to the world as mother
would, but rather "speaks" the world into existence as only a FatherGod could.
I find these claims to be odd for a number of reasons. First of all, why
think that only a God called Father could speak the world into being?
Can mothers not speak? Well, yes, the reply might go, but they would
not "speak" the world into being; they would "birth" it into being in a
way, say, analogous to how human mothers give birth. 51 But analogy to
creaturely parents surely cannot serve as the guide here for human
fathers do not "speak" their children into being. In fact, as any seventh
grade student of biology will tell you, human children spring from the
loins of their fathers as much as they do the body of their mothers.
Based on the analogy of human parenting, there is no reason to
believe that speaking of God as "Mother" any more leads to a pantheistic identification of God and the world than does speaking of God as
"Father." If by "pantheism" one means the view that God is identical to
the world, as in Spinoza's view that God and the world are one substance, then the relationship between mothers and their children is hardly a parallel case. A mother and her child are two distinct entities.
Mothers are no more identical to their children than are fathers. And,
for that matter, fathers are no more unlike their children, no more
"wholly other" in any radical ontological sense which preserves transcendence than are mothers. In fact, not only is there no good reason to
think that referring exclusively to God as "Father" preserves God's transcendence any more than referring to God as "Mother," but there is
good reason to steer clear of this kind of reasoning. For the insistence
that the use of father-language preserves the otherness of God in a way
that mother-language cannot simply serves to perpetuate the image of
the absent or aloof father, an image contemporary fathers have made
efforts at trying to overcome.
Finally, it is unclear to what extent language that connotes an intimacy between God and the world is theologically problematic. The
Christian God is both immanent to the world as well as transcendent
from the world. If calling God "Mother" serves to remind us of the
closeness and intimacy we as God's children share with God then it fulfills a very useful theological and pastoral function. For far from leading
to our identification with God or the claim that we ourselves are somehow gods, the sense of our intimacy with God ought to reinforce our
ultimate dependence on God for our very being. For the Bible reminds
us that, like the helpless fetus in her mother's womb, "in God we live
and move and have our being" (Acts 17.28). There is no clearer biblical
statement than this of the extent to which we, as creatures, are by virtue
of our being in God. There is no better analogical relationship to this radical dependency of one being upon the being of another than the dependency of the fetus on his mother, without whom he is simply not viable.
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That is why Paul Tillich can say that the symbolic dimension of God as
the "ground of being," "points to the mother-quality of giving birth, carrying, and embracing, and, at the same time, of calling back, resisting
independence of the created, and swallowing it."s2 Far from encouraging an inflated sense of ourselves as gods, the image of God as Mother,
when properly understood, leads to a profound sense of our creaturely
dependence on God the creator.53

v.

Theology and Human Interests

One of the primary motivations behind the recent critiques of the
inclusive language movement is the concern that theology is being made
to serve other, more ideological or political interests.54 This is certainly a
legitimate concern. Christians ought not remake God into the image of
their pet ideology simply in order to serve their social or political interests. That is precisely why Christian philosophers and theologians
should be hesitant to promote the use of exclusively masculine language
to speak about God. For as feminist theologians rightly point out, such
language can and has been used to serve a sexist, patriarchal ideology.55
A healthy dose of the hermeneutics of suspicion teaches us that even
well-intentioned Christians may use theology or the Bible to serve some
self-serving will to power. 56 "Everything is dangerous" warns Michel
Foucault, alluding to how the drive for power and domination infests all
that we do, even in areas where we least suspect it." One can rightly
wonder, then, to what extent the weak philosophical and theological reasons given for the exclusion of feminine language about God are merely
transparent masks which hardly conceal the power interests they, consciously or not, serve. To put this postmodern insight into Christian terminology, no human interpretation of God's revelation, no matter how
seemingly benign and well-intentioned, is immune from sinfulness.
It is thus too simplistic to believe, as Achtemeier and other critics of
inclusive language do, that the choice in this debate simply comes down
to whether or not one regards the Bible as the words of God. Assuming
the Christian thinker does acknowledge the Bible to be divine revelation,
then, for these critics, the predominant use of masculine language settles
the issue against inclusive language. In this view, for feminists to
explain the preponderance of masculine images for God in terms of the
contingencies of the context of the Biblical revelation, and in particular,
the patriarchy of the time and place, is to deny the divine character of
the revelation. It is to substitute human interests for "pure" theology.
Yet these sorts of criticisms are mistaken on two counts. First, they
assume that one can interpret scripture in a way that is free from all subjectivity, that is, all human finitude and fallibility. But one's own limitations, including one's sinful self-interest, will always render one's
understanding of the Biblical revelation less than God's own understanding of it. To admit this much is simply to admit that one is not
God, but a limited, fallible human being. This is an admission
Christians are obligated to make. Second, such a position erroneously
substitutes what sounds more like the Muslim view of scripture as the
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unmediated revelation of God for the dominant Christian view. In the
main, the Christian tradition has always understood the Biblical revelation as writings inspired by God but written by human beings. In this
view, the Bible does not fall from the sky already made, but is received
through the mediation of human prophets, their particular languages,
and their particular historical and cultural contexts. Therefore, it is not
as if the choice were whether one regards the Bible to be either God's
word or a record of human beings' evolving consciousness of God: the
scriptures are God's word revealed through human being's evolving,
and limited, historical consciousness. To think otherwise is to treat language about God, including the language God uses to speak to us, with
the same ultimacy as God. And this substitution of what is not God for
God is the essence of idolatry, a sin Christian thinkers have an obligation
to avoid.

VI. Conclusion
In this paper I have argued that the major reasons why Christians
ought to desist from the use of feminine language for God, including the
phrase "God the Mother," are not persuasive. On the contrary, not only
are there no good reasons for avoiding inclusive language about God,
there is good reason for advocating its use. Perhaps the best reason to
refer to God as "Mother" in addition to "Father" is that it helps us to
avoid confusing God with a limited, gendered image or model of God.
Indeed, to exclude feminine language about God from Christian discourse, to insist that God could only be referred to as Father and not
Mother, is to promote unwittingly another form of idolatry. 58 For such
linguistic exclusion risks substituting one particular, gender-specific
name for the gender-less, infinitely mysterious God who is primarily
revealed to us as "I am who I am" (Exodus 3.13), the name which defies
all names. It risks substituting one finite image of God for the infinite
divine reality. And it perpetuates both an androcentric, limited understanding of God's nature and the deleterious effects of such a limited
understanding. In short, it is to worship a name, a metaphor - not a
graven image, perhaps, but an image nonetheless.
Christians must say "no" to this for it is wrong not only theologically
but morally as well. In making it difficult for women to recognize that
they, too, are made in the image of God, the gender-specific connotations
of the exclusive use of God the Father provides the basis for both the continued treatment of women as morally secondary to men and their marginalization within church and society. The exclusive use of masculine
language for God uses theology in the service of a very different set of
human interests, a very different ideology than that of the feminists, but
an ideology nonetheless. For as Elizabeth Johnson and other feminist
theologians have maintained, the way we speak and think about God has
real consequences for people's lives. As Johnson ably puts it:
In sum, exclusive, literal patriarchal speech about God is both
oppressive and idolatrous. It functions to justify social structures
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of dominance/subordination and an androcentric world view
inimical to the genuine and equal human dignity of women, while
it simultaneously restricts the mystery of God. SY
While it may often be difficult to see how easily our images or concepts of God become our idols, it is even more difficult to see how our
conceptual idols may adversely affect both others and ourselves. 60 · Yet,
as John Calvin rightly observed, "The human mind is, so to speak, a perpetual factory of idols."61 Christian philosophers and theologians ought
to resist allowing the masculine image of God the Father to function as
another harmful idol. We ought, then, to be open to the positive and liberating effects of gender inclusive language about God. We ought to
allow ourselves to reclaim the image of God the Mother, lest we ignore
Moses's exhortation and forget the God who gave us birth
(Deuteronomy 32.18).62
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